Controlling the commoners by van Weeren, R. & De Moor, M.
AgHR 62, II, pp. 256–77 256
 * The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council under 
the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007–2013)/ERC Grant agreement no. 240928 as 
part of the project ‘“United we stand”. The dynamics and consequences of institutions for collective action in 
pre-industrial Europe’ and from The Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) Internationali-
sation Grant for the project ‘“Common Rules”. The regulation of institutions for managing commons in Europe, 
1100–1800’. For all further details on these projects: see www.collective-action.info.
 1 Since the publication by Douglas North of his 
Institutions, institutional change and economic perfor-
mance (1990). There is even a Journal of Institutional 
Economics, which is devoted to the study of the nature, 
role, and evolutions of institutions in the economy, 
including firms, states, markets, money, households, 
and other vital institutions and organizations. For 
reviews of this debate, see F. Gagliardi, ‘Institutions 
and economic change: a critical survey of the new insti-
tutional approaches and empirical evidence’, J. Socio-
economics 37 (2008), pp. 216–44.
 2 See D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson, and J. A. Robin-
son, ‘Institutions as the fundamental cause of long-run 
growth’, in P. Aghion and S. Durlauf (eds), Handbook 
of economic growth (2005), pp. 385–472; D. North, 
Understanding the process of economic change (2005). 
Controlling the commoners:  
Methods to prevent, detect, and punish free-riding 
on Dutch commons in the early modern period*
controlling the early modern dutch commoners
by René van Weeren and Tine De Moor
Abstract
The making of rules by institutions of collective action, such as commons, has been and still is an 
instrument to promote desired behaviour and to prevent free-riding and other individual actions that 
might affect the collective interest negatively. In this article, we use the historical markeboeken of four 
Dutch commons (marken) to study the way in which commoners sought to guarantee the resilience 
and longevity of the common, by analysing the design of regulations against unauthorized use, the 
interaction of those rules with internal and external developments, and the effects that various forms 
of penalty may have had on the behaviour of commoners.
Over the past few decades, the New Institutional Economics has had a major influence on a 
number of aspects of economic history.1 Institutions have come to the forefront as the sort of 
mediators that are necessary in a society to keep it in balance, helping it withstand the many 
external influences that may lead to its demise: ‘good’ institutions deliver a resilient society.2 
More recently, one particular institution, the commons, has attracted a great deal of interest, 
both among social scientists – as a direct consequence of the award of the 2009 Nobel prize in 
Economics to Elinor Ostrom – and outside the academic world, as part of a larger movement, 
in particular within north-western Europe, to revive citizens’ participation in many spheres of 
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society and economy. However, notwithstanding the many studies of present-day functioning 
of commons, our knowledge of how such institutions can – over the (very) long run – offer a 
meaningful contribution to economy and society is limited. It can only be enlarged by studying 
– in detail – the functioning of historical examples of collective resource management. Although 
the early modern context offers us many examples of commons that survived over centuries, 
the mechanisms that enabled commoners to overcome the social dilemmas they faced are still 
insufficiently understood. The many similarities in the ways resource use was restricted, how 
the daily management of the commons was organized, social control was encouraged, and 
participation was optimized in commons regulation throughout Europe suggest that there is 
a certain basic logic to how working together in the long-run can be facilitated. Comparing 
sets of regulations created by long-enduring commons throughout their existence could 
allow us to ‘distil’ the mechanisms that are used to overcome social dilemmas over very long 
periods of time. Such a ‘distillation’ has already been done by Ostrom in her seminal work 
Governing the commons (1990) but, as she indicated herself in later work, the timeframe within 
which her cases fitted was rather short, covering no more than a few decades. The real ‘art of 
co-operation’ lies in the capacity to build an institution that endures for many generations.
As all students of historical commons will understand, the systematic comparison of commons 
regulation over time is a cumbersome task, for which no clear methodology has yet been 
developed. So far as we know, commoners of one common did not communicate with those of 
another common about how to regulate the use and management of their respective commons, 
unless they were entangled in conflict over inter-commoning (where commons stretched 
over the borders of one or more villages). Nor is there any clear evidence of regulations being 
copied from one common to another; hence we can assume that the rules for the government 
of any single common are generated locally in reaction to the problems of that common. In 
this article we will develop a first step towards building a methodology to compare commons 
regulation, even across national boundaries, by focusing on one particular aspect of commons 
government, ‘free-riding’, which we define as people gaining profits by exercising rights to 
which they were not entitled or by entitled users exercising their rights in an unauthorized way.
The issue of control over the commoners’ behaviour, ex ante or ex post the actual use of 
the resources, is vital to understanding how a self-governing institution manages to focus its 
commoners’ minds on the long-term survival of their common rather than their individual 
short-term advantage. Although a third party will need to legitimate, adjudicate, and enforce 
the relevant rights,3 the actual design of the rules was largely in the hands of the direct 
stakeholders: the commons are self-governing institutions, meaning that their stakeholders 
can define, amend, and even abolish the rules (which we shall call by-laws) that regulate 
access or usage of the common whenever required. Restraining the homo economicus in 
each of the commoners and promoting their compliance with the body of by-laws can be 
achieved through preventive measures, through social control, and through monitoring in 
combination with repressive measures. Prevention by setting ex ante restrictions on the use 
of the resources clearly is the cheapest solution, although the making of good, effective rules 
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for access, use, and governance also demands time and effort on the part of the commoners. 
However, such ‘self-restrictions’ may not be enough and somewhat more active mechanisms 
to detect infringements of the rules may be needed to enforce adherence to them. Social 
control – commoners controlling each other both actively and passively – is somewhat more 
time-consuming, but, as we will demonstrate, can also be beneficial for the ‘social controller’; 
monitoring and activating repressive mechanisms are among the more time- and resource-
intensive ways to prevent free-riding. As we will demonstrate, the role of the commoner in each 
of these methods is pivotal. It has been argued, by Elinor Ostrom among others, that a high 
degree of stakeholder participation is one of the factors that leads to high levels of resilience, 
and explains why many such institutions – from commons to irrigation systems – managed to 
survive for many centuries.4 Whether the users of the institution are capable of dealing with 
crises – economic, social, or political – is dependent on whether and how they adjust their 
rules in response to these changes. 
In this article we will use the example of the Dutch markegenootschappen in the eastern 
part of the modern Netherlands to explore how these three ways of control were put into 
practice. Our results are based on a meticulous analysis of the regulation of four commons. 
All four commons survived for over 200 years, during which timespan they adjusted their 
body of by-laws at least three times. This selection should allow us to capture change on the 
commons, and see how such change was dealt with in the regulations. Our analysis is based 
on a predefined database structure designed to process all the different aspects of governance 
that can be found in the rules regulating these commons, but which is nevertheless sufficiently 
specific to capture the many varieties of access, use, and management of the commons.5 For the 
four selected commons, we have analysed 1137 original by-laws, i.e. rules that were mentioned 
as such as well as recorded decisions of the assembly of commoners that concerned the creation 
of a new rule or the revision of an existing one.6 
With our systematic analysis, we also try to broaden the scope of methods used to prevent 
free-riding. With social dilemma games, prisoner games, and public good games, as well as 
variations on these, experimental sociologists and economists have repeatedly tested in a 
laboratory setting the willingness of individuals to co-operate, or to show altruism, and the 
conditions under which they do so.7 This has led in recent years to a narrowing of the focus 
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onto the punishments or sanctions which might be brought against those who placed their 
own interest above that of the collective. Other methods – such as social control – can be far 
cheaper and more efficient ways of discouraging free-riding, as will be demonstrated in this 
article. Historians have unearthed and identified the mechanisms for preventing free-riding on 
the commons in the past,8 but this has (so far) not been done in a systematic and comparative 
way for (very) long-term cases. With a comprehensive comparison it may become clearer – not 
just to historians but to scholars of co-operation across many disciplines – that dealing with 
the threat of free-riding is not just a matter of punishment but of a subtle combination of 
mechanisms that adapt themselves to the changes in the environment – in its broadest sense of 
the word – and also to the availability of the resources. This article is a first step in unravelling 
what methods to control commoners’ behaviour and, by extension, individual behaviour in any 
self-governing institution, are most appropriate. 
We will start this article with a short account of the institutional aspects of commons such 
as the marken and the social, judicial, and environmental context within which the commoners 
had to operate (Section I). In the central part of the article, we will focus on the regulations of 
the selected commons and describe which control mechanisms the commoners used to promote 
the proper use of the common and to prevent free-riding (Section II). A conclusion follows.
I
In its origins, the term ‘mark’ (marke) seems to have referred to the marks made to define the 
boundaries of land owned by either individual owners or by a group of owners: in some cases 
boundary stones, in other cases (especially in wet or swampy areas, such as the peat bogs, 
where such heavy markers tended to sink and disappear) poles or other visual markers were 
used. This practice of determining the boundaries of the various marks is mentioned in the 
resolutions and regulations concerning the mark, usually registered in the so-called ‘books of 
the mark’ (markeboeken). 
The ‘mark’ became synonymous with the organizational form of managing and governing 
the area that was destined for common use. According to Hoppenbrouwers, the term 
‘marks’ was the ‘customary general name both for corporations of people entitled to the use 
of specified common waste lands, and for such lands themselves’.9 The organization itself, 
however, is generally referred to as ‘markegenootschap’, the latter part of the word literally 
meaning ‘association’. Since other terms (as meenten) were also used for the combination of 
land use and governance system, Hoppenbrouwers narrowed down the use of the term ‘marks’ 
to refer to ‘user corporations that were set up and initially operated separately from general 
local government’. This kind of institution for collective action was the predominant form of 
common land governance in the areas of the current provinces of Gelderland and Overijssel;10 
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in other parts of the northern Netherlands, the management of common and uncultivated 
land was often linked more closely to the local government and was usually referred to with 
the term meent.11
Given the lack of a uniform definition of the concept of the mark(egenootschap), it is barely 
possible to pinpoint the period of origin of the marks.12 The most decisive criterion would 
be the first appearance of the mark as an institution, usually the moment when the first (or 
at least the oldest preserved) set of rules that governed the access, use, and management 
of the common were drawn up. The oldest examples of such regulations often consist of a 
single document, written on parchment, to which the seal of the local authority was put, 
and date from the end of the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth century. Such 
documents mostly developed into real markeboeken, which contained all further regulations 
and resolutions agreed upon at the general meetings, as well as more administrative business, 
such as the registration of shares or financial matters.
Many Dutch markegenootschappen have left behind extensive series of by-laws, often contained 
in the markeboeken. However, in order to study the long-term resilience and the dynamics of 
these regulations, we have selected only commons with a lifespan of at least two centuries. 
Although we are aware that longevity is just one way to measure institutional success, a 
lifespan of over two centuries at least indicates that the commoners were able to bridge several 
generations, whilst dealing with changing circumstances, both internally and externally. To 
study the dynamics within the institution of the commons, we narrowed our selection even 
further down to those commons that had amended their regulations at least three times over 
these two centuries. We do realize that this selection procedure involves some bias. On the 
one hand, there is the bias created by archival survival: by using the regulations of commons 
as our main source for analysis, we implicitly exclude those commons that may have been no 
less successful, but for which no records have been preserved. On the other hand, there is a 
theoretical possibility that our selection criteria excluded commons which had drawn up rules 
that were extremely resilient, in the sense that they were not amended more than once over 
200 years: however, as we have not yet found any examples of this bias, this seems to be only 
a theoretical possibility.13 For this article, we have selected four Dutch commons that complied 
with these criteria: the mark of Berkum (bef. 1300–1995), the mark of Raalterwoold (bef. 
1445–1843), Dunsborger Hattemer mark (bef. 1553–c.1847), and the mark of Exel (1616–1852). In 
order to minimize the effect of different external factors (environmental, political, economic, 
etc.), we chose four commons that were located in the same region (see Figure 1). The distance 
from the most northern mark (the mark of Berkum) to the most southern (Dunsborger 
Hattemer mark) is no more than 55 kilometres as the crow flies. Secondary literature as well as 
the contents of the regulations indicate that the socio-economic and environmental conditions 
of the area were broadly similar for all four selected commons.14 Given the nature of our main 
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The majority of the marks in the Netherlands ceased to exist in the course of the nineteenth 
century, with a peak in dissolutions in the 1840s and 1850s. Three legislative measures formed 
the basis of this ‘eventide’ of the marks. First, the Royal Decree of 10 May 1810 placed a new 
financial burden on the marks: all lands had to be taxed, including the uncultivated – and 
previously untaxed – parts of the mark. An additional incentive for dissolution was the 
exemption from taxation for newly reclaimed land.15 The self-governing status of the marks, 
f ig u r e  1. Map of the province of Overijssel by Isaac Tirion (1775).
Indicated are the location of this area on a present-day map of the Netherlands and the approximate locations 
of the respective commons selected for discussion in this article: (1) mark of Berkum, (2) mark of Raalterwoold, 
(3) mark of Exel, (4) Dunsborger Hattemermark.
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however, remained intact: it was up to the assemblies of the marks themselves whether or not 
to decide to divide the common and uncultivated lands of the mark. As the survey undertaken 
by Demoed shows, this initial decree seems to have had little effect.16 The contents of the 
regulations and resolutions of the assemblies of the marks, however, provide more nuance 
to these figures: although the number of complete and final dissolutions of marks remained 
relatively low between 1819 and 1839, the markeboeken reveal increasing concern among the 
members of the mark about its financial status, sometimes resulting in the decision to sell 
parts of the common in order to try to solve the debts owed by the mark.17 The Royal Decree 
of 24 June 1837 brought the legislation of 1810 to the attention of the marks once more; the 
final implementation of tax exemption for reclaimed land that was formerly common and 
uncultivated, as mentioned in the corresponding Law of 1840, may have been decisive for most 
marks in their decision to divide and sell the remainder of the common land the mark owned, 
resulting in the final dissolution of the majority of the marks between 1840 and 1859.18
Although almost all marks had disappeared by the end of the nineteenth century, some 
marks still survived, either de jure or de facto. One of the case studies we used for this article, 
the mark of Berkum, managed to survive until the 1990s, after which the remaining assets of 
the mark were used to create a fund for the promotion of organizations for the advancement 
of regional heritage.19
The markegenootschappen were most numerous in the eastern part of the northern 
Netherlands: our inventory, based on archival sources and secondary literature, proves that, 
out of a total of 910 commons which existed at some time in the northern Netherlands, about 
700 were located in the area of the current provinces of Drente, Gelderland, and Overijssel.20 
The four commons studied in this article were located on the sandy parts of the provinces of 
Overijssel (the marks of Raalterwoold and Berkum) and Gelderland (Dunsborger Hattemer 
mark and the mark of Exel) (see Figure 1). Until the first half of the thirteenth century, large 
areas of the eastern provinces of the northern Netherlands were covered by forests. The rapid 
population growth and, subsequently, the vast land reclamations which took place between 
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1250 and 1350, in combination with extensive grazing, caused severe deforestation, degradation 
of the soil, and sand drifts.21 All the available resources of the area of the selected commons 
are mentioned in the appendix. 
The medieval and early modern socio-economic development of the area to which the 
selected commons belonged was quite different from the exceptional prosperous economic 
development of the maritime areas (gewesten) of Holland and Zeeland in the same period.22 
The degree of urbanization may at first glance seem to be similar to that of the western 
maritime gewesten, but was however limited to a handful of cities (e.g. Kampen, Zwolle, and 
Deventer), while the major part of the area had a (very) low population density. The socio-
economic differences between the cities and the countryside also applied to the distribution of 
wealth with substantial inequality between the cities and the countryside. There was, however, 
less inequality between the farmers: although they had a relatively low income, data from early 
modern tax registers show relatively little difference between the individual farmers.23
In the area in which the commons considered in this article were situated, there was less 
possibility of extending the farmed area by reclamation than in the maritime areas. First, it was 
dominated by large manors owned by noblemen and religious institutions:24 in the first half of 
the sixteenth century, for example, about half of the area of Salland was owned by either the 
nobility or the clergy whereas in the same period in Holland such parties owned only about 
one fifth of the land.25 Furthermore, due to the absence of extensive nearby market facilities 
and a relatively low level of urbanization26 the agricultural activities of farmers focused on local 
subsistence production.27 About 95 per cent of the households had at least one cow, but herds 
remained relatively small, with 4 to 5 animals per household on average. By comparison, in 
Holland the average number of cows owned per farmer was considerably higher (about 12 to 
15), but 75 per cent of the Holland farmers did not own any cattle. The inequality in Holland 
between farmers was therefore considerably larger than in the eastern regions, even though 
in the course of the early modern period the number of households in Holland owning 
cattle doubled.28 
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Short leasehold, generally for 5 to 12 years, was in this area, as in most of the other areas 
in the northern Netherlands, introduced later than in Holland and Zeeland. The lease ratio 
in this however rose to over 90 per cent for the Salland region in the middle of the sixteenth 
century, whereas the overall lease ratio in Holland and Zeeland stayed relatively low.29 A reason 
for the success of the short leasehold in the eastern Northern Netherlands may have been the 
dependence of both landowners and peasants in this area on this type of tenancy. Whereas 
landowners had a system of serfdom in the high Middle Ages, the dissolution of manorialism 
in the late Middle Ages and the monetarization of rents in kind forced them to search for 
new ways of tenancy, since unfree labour was no longer at their disposal.30 At the same time, 
farmers had few opportunities to get hold of land themselves due to their limited resources, 
the absence of an active land market,31 and the absence of opportunities to reclaim new land 
(as was the case in the maritime areas, where those who reclaimed new land became the de 
facto owners of the reclaimed area)32 and therefore were dependent on obtaining a lease under 
the most favourable conditions. The combination of this competitive element (landowners 
searching for capable tenants, farmers looking for suitable land on good conditions), as well as 
relative low population pressure and ample supply of land to let, may have led to the highest 
lease ratio in the northern Netherlands, and in north-western Europe for that matter.33 In the 
course of the early modern era, landownership in the eastern northern Netherlands changed, 
and large peasant freeholdings emerged, replacing both manorial landowners as well as a 
substantial part of the small peasant farms.34 
Data from archival sources show the practically unchanged importance of agriculture as 
means of employment in the eastern provinces until well into the nineteenth century: in 1807, 
about 70 per cent of the rural population in both provinces of Overijssel and Gelderland owned 
cattle,35 while at the end of the eighteenth century, some 46 per cent of the working population 
of Overijssel were still employed in agriculture.36 In comparison, in the maritime gewesten, these 
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 37 Van Zanden, ‘Inequality in an inland province’, 
p. 63, Table 4.5.
 38 Ibid., p. 72, Table 4.8.
 39 Article 37 states that any erfgenaam who would be 
elected markenrichter unanimously at the assembly of 
the common, would be obliged to accept this function. 
On his refusal, he was to be fined a barrel of wine whilst 
remaining obliged to fulfill the task of markenrichter. 
If the fine was not paid by the elected markenrichter, it 
could be imposed on his tenants, who in their turn were 
allowed to deduct the imposed fine from the contribu-
tion they had to pay to their landlord. This latter clause 
implies that only the owners of large pieces of land in 
the common would be elected as markenrichter. Addi-
tionally, article 38 of the same regulation states that 
the markenrichter should annually draw up accounts, 
to be assessed by committed members of the assembly, 
therefore implying that the markenrichter should be lit-
erate and have basic accountancy skills. Literacy of the 
markenrichter is also implicitly presumed in article 39, 
which prescribes that all decisions made at the annual 
meeting of the common should be written down in the 
markenboek by the markerichter. Finally, articles 41 and 
42 indicate that the elected markenrichter should have 
sufficient financial means, since he was held to guar-
antee that his successor would not be confronted with 
running debts from commoners incurred under his 
predecessor (art. 41) as well as to welcome any new enti-
tled member of the common with ‘a good drink’ (art. 
42). See: Hannink, Markeboek Raalterwoold, pp. 4–5.
percentages varied from about 26 per cent (southern part of Holland) to 36 per cent (province 
of Utrecht). The same figures however also prove the difference in farm size mentioned earlier: 
whereas the herds of the western farmers in average consisted of about 12 animals, the average 
size for herds in the eastern provinces was between four and five animals.37 An indication of 
the distribution of wealth and the level of income is provided by the income tax records of 
the so-called Quotisatie of 1808: the data show that almost 80 per cent of all inhabitants of 
the rural village of Delden in the province of Overijssel belonged to the lowest four (of 41) tax 
categories.38 The rural area of the eastern Low Countries therefore may be characterized as 
predominantly rural in character with relatively low income levels for the farmers.
In terms of the legal context, the major part of all land was in the possession of large 
landowners, many of whom belonged to the landed nobility of the inland gewesten. In the 
case of seigneuries, the position of chairman of the assembly of the common (markerichter) 
was usually connected to the ownership of the seigneurial estate: in those cases the lord of the 
manor therefore automatically gained the position of erfmarkenrichter. In other commons, the 
markerichter was elected by the commoners. Of the cases discussed in this article, both the 
mark of Exel and the mark of Raalterwoold had an erfmarkerichter, although the latter mark 
changed to elected markerichters at the end of the fourteenth century. The mark of Berkum and 
the Dunsborger Hattemer mark both only had elected markerichters. Although the regulations 
of our four cases do not explicitly mention either the requested qualifications of a (candidate) 
markerichter, nor describe the election procedures, from the rules stating the tasks of the 
markerichter that were copied into the new markeboek of Raalterwoold in 1615, we can derive 
that any candidate for the post of markenrichter should be literate, financially well-to-do, and 
have some accountancy skills. The elected markerichters therefore usually belonged to the 
upper social classes among the commoners.39 
The (erf)markerichter was formally the highest official in the mark: being the representative 
of the mark in formal matters, he was also in charge of convening and presiding over the 
regular (annual) as well as the emergency meetings of the assembly of commoners. He was also 
the keeper of the markeboek. The formal status of the markenboek is shown in an injunction 
contained in the regulations of the mark of Raalterwoold of 1445, which stated that the 
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 40 Hannink, Markeboek Raalterwoold, p. 5. A vier-
deel is an ancient Dutch measure of content (literally 
translated ‘a quarter’), used for an amount of wine, 
beer, or grain.
 41 The number of regulations preserved, however, 
does not always provide an exact indication of the 
number of meetings held. Sometimes it was decided 
to replace an older set of previous resolutions and 
regulations by a completely new one; this new regula-
tion would then only contain the rules and resolutions 
still in force at that moment. An example is the oldest 
preserved markenboek of the mark of Raalterwoold, 
dating from 1615, which contains rules still in force 
from regulations dating from 1445, 1541, 1560, 1598, 
1604, 1608, 1609, 1610, 1611, and 1614 (Hannink, Marke-
boek Raalterwoold, pp. 1–21). 
 markerichter always had to show this book at the meeting of the commoners. If he failed to 
do so, he would have to pay a vierdeel of wine.40
The jurisdiction in the area of our selected commons originally belonged to the bailiff (drost) 
of Salland (for the marken of Berkum and Raalterwoold) and the bailiff (landdrost) of the 
County of Zutphen (for the mark Exel and the Dunsborger Hattemer mark); each bailiwick 
was divided in several sheriff’s dominions (in Overijssel called schoutambten, in Gelderland 
rechter- or richterambten). For the period concerned (from the late fifteenth century on) 
however, the (land)drost already had delegated the administration of justice in most civil and 
criminal cases to the sheriff (schout), who presided over the so-called ‘parish courts’ (kerspel-
gerechten); only capital offences still had to be brought before higher courts. The jurisdiction 
of the mark of Exel theoretically differed from the other three commons, since the lord of the 
estate of Amsen possessed the seigneurial right of administering justice within his seigniory; 
like most other seigneurial lords he however refrained of this right and referred most legal 
cases (in any case, all criminal cases) to the regular kerspelgerechten. 
There is no explicit description of the legal standing of the by-laws made for the regulation 
of commons within the larger system of law. The texts of the by-laws themselves indicate that 
they were widely recognized as formal legislation and that the administration of justice in the 
commons was regarded as a regular form of justice: in several by-laws it is mentioned that the 
offender should be convicted ‘according to the legislation of the mark’ (‘naar markenregte’). 
The earliest by-laws often also indicate that they were based on previous charters and/or 
existing customary rights. 
Changes in the by-laws, like all other general decisions concerning the management of the 
mark, the appointment (or dismissal) of officials acting on behalf of the mark, and the access 
and use of the mark and its resources – including the sanctions on infractions – were mainly 
made at the regular general meetings of the assembly of the mark (markevergadering, in the 
most eastern parts of the area also known as holting or holtink) or, in case of very urgent matters, 
at emergency meetings (nootholtinke). Decisions at both annual and emergency meetings were 
taken by vote, provided that a certain quorum of all commoners would be present. All meetings 
were to be announced by or on behalf of the markenrichter in advance at church.41
III
Control of the commons was, as mentioned above, achieved – by and large – in three ways: 
through preventing the use of the commons’ resources by non-entitled users and overuse 
or misuse by the entitled users; through encouraging social control; and through punishing 
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 42 Some of the regulations, however, imply that the sworn members were also involved in the daily implementa-
tion of the rules and resolutions of the mark. The regulation of 1445 (transcribed 1615) of the mark of Raalterwoold 
provides an example in the 29th article, where it is stated that only the chairmen of the assembly of the mark 
as well as the sworn members were allowed to impound animals; the actual involvement of the sworn members 
in executing this sanction is also indicated by the additional permission granted to the regular members of the 
common to execute this sanction themselves in case the sworn members would refuse to execute the sanction 
at the indication of commoners (Hannink, Markeboek Raalterwoold, p. 4). See also Hoppenbrouwers, ‘Use and 
management’, pp. 95–6.
free-riders who had committed an offence. In our article we will focus on the latter two control 
mechanisms, as methods for the prevention of overuse or misuse, for instance stinting, have 
already received a great deal of attention in the literature. The type of penalties applied in case 
of the detection of free-riding, and the role commoners had to play in this themselves, through 
active or passive social control have, however, to our knowledge, received hardly any attention. 
We will start with a summary of the ways in which free-riding was detected. Next we will pay 
special attention to the methods of enhancing social control and then move on to an overview 
of the types and levels of sanctions and penalties that could used against offenders. These 
needed to be of an acceptable type and level for the offence committed: if monetary fines were 
too high, then there was a danger that offenders would not pay the sums imposed on them. If 
fines were too low, the offender might be willing to take the risk of getting caught, since the 
possible profits gained from his illegal behaviour would outweigh the eventual fine imposed. We 
will examine the risk of being caught while free-riding as a factor that was of influence on the 
effectiveness of a sanction. This aspect is hard to detect on the basis of regulation, as this would 
require a study of the financial records to see the revenues received from fines. However, as we 
will demonstrate, the by-laws sometimes referred to difficulties in securing the payment of fines.
The surveillance and detection of offences could be accomplished either by appointing 
officers or via mechanisms of social control, which were often incentivized by giving those who 
reported offences a share of the fines, or through the so-called liability clauses. 
(a) Monitoring
The management of the common and the detection and punishment of offenders against 
its rules was usually delegated by the assembly of commoners to specific members. None 
of the regulations we studied actually defines the duties of the officers appointed to govern 
the common. This may be explained by the fact that the regulations were first and foremost 
intended for internal use by the commoners themselves, making an explicit job description 
for officials unnecessary. Management tasks (such as the taxation of land or representing the 
mark in formal or judicial matters) were usually delegated to the chairman of the assembly 
of the mark, and sometimes to one or more members authorized for the purpose, who were 
often drawn from the group of ‘inheritors’ (erfgenamen or geërfden). The officers responsible for 
detecting and punishing offences were obliged to accept this task – be it willingly or unwillingly. 
The principal task of the sworn members (gezworenen, swaeren) consisted of enforcing by-laws 
and fines for infringements, whereas the so-called schutters were responsible for impounding 
animals found grazing illegally (schutten), collecting imposed fines, and executing other kinds 
of penalties.42 In marks other than those dealt with in this article, additional types of officials 
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 43 The appointment usually lasted for one or two 
years. Exceptions, however, have been mentioned in the 
regulations we studied. The exception could either be 
an extended duration of the appointment (in case the 
assembly of the mark saw this fit) or a shortened period 
of time, in case the appointed members fulfilled their 
tasks in an unsatisfactory way. 
 44 Examples: regulation of the mark of Exel of 4 June 
1661: fine of 10 goudgulden on transporting peat by 
farmers, ‘these fines to be executed without any con-
nivance’’ (G. J. Beuzel, Markeboek van de marke Exel 
(1988), p. 17); regulation of the mark of Raalterwoold 
of 17 August 1686, fine of barrel of beer at value of 
12 gulden, ‘these fines … to be executed without any 
connivance’ (Hannink, Markeboek van Raalterwoold, 
p. 78); regulation of Dunsborgermark of 13 June 1609: 
fine for not paying proper contribution to war payment 
of grain [sware garve] of 50 goudgulden, imposed on 
both the inheritor and the tenant farmer, ‘without any 
connivance’ (A. Menkveld and J. Renema, Markeboek 
van de Dunsborger en Hattemer Marke, 1553–1810 [1996], 
p. 10).
 45 Repeated negligence of these tasks in some 
cases even led to an early dismissal of the appointed 
members; we cannot know whether this negligence was 
only due to the character of the appointed member, or 
if neglecting his task would gain him more profit than 
fulfilling his tasks properly, even at the risk of losing 
his appointment. Nonetheless, punitive sanctions for 
the poor fulfillment of tasks did not appear to be effec-
tive in the end: e.g. almost every regulation issued in 
the Dunsborger Hattemer mark from 1686 on explicitly 
stated that the schutters should keep a close eye on the 
strict implementation of these rules; failing to perform 
this task properly would be sanctioned by their dis-
missal. Cf. also van Zanden, ‘Paradox’, pp. 133 and 135.
 46 Menkveld and Renema, Markeboek Dunsborger 
Hattemer Marke, pp. 63–4.
 47 Beuzel, Markeboek Exel, p. 17.
 48 See for example the regulation of 15 May 1679, from 
the mark of Exel, imposing the sanction of a payment 
of half a barrel of beer on schutters not reporting stated 
offences to the chairman of the assembly of the mark or 
the commissioned members (Beuzel, Markeboek Exel, 
p. 26). 
have been noticed, such as vorster (literally ‘investigator’, the officer in charge of guarding the 
proper use of common fields) or woudgraaf (best translated as ‘forest keeper’ or woodward). 
Although their function reflected local environmental circumstances and the resources of the 
individual mark, their tasks were broadly similar to those of the schutters.
From a reading of the by-laws and other records, we can conclude that this monitoring 
system was based on a system of rotation and that all members of the mark were obliged to 
take their turn.43 Some of the rules clearly indicate that not every member wanted to fulfil his 
duty, and penalties were set for those who tried to refuse their appointment. Paying a fine could 
not be used by members as a way of evading this obligation:44 instead, the rules explicitly state 
that, having paid his fine, the member nonetheless had to perform the office to which he had 
been appointed.45 Many examples show that being a schutter was not a very popular job: at the 
meeting of 4 August 1696 of the Dunsborger Hattemer mark, it was recorded that, ‘since year 
after year there have been many complaints about the current schutters … failing to fulfil their 
tasks, not functioning properly, and not executing the orders issued from time to time by the 
chairmen of the assembly of the mark and the inheritors’, these schutters should be ‘deported 
and dismissed, and replaced by other schutters’.46 For some other functions a buy-off could be 
used; in Exel, for example, the time to be spent as secretary of the mark was provisionally set 
at two consecutive annual meetings. However, in case any of the farmers ‘owning cart and 
horses’ refused to fulfil this role, they would have to pay one daalder for each meeting.47 To 
make the supervisory system even more watertight, schutters themselves could be penalized 
with various forms of fine, or even dismissal, for failing to report offences to the authorities of 
the mark.48 At a meeting of the mark of Exel of 23 May 1695, it was ordered that a schutter who 
did not report an offence would have to pay the fine for the offence himself. At Raalterwoold, 
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 49 Beuzel, Markeboek Exel, p. 33; Hannink, Marke-
boek Raalterwoold, p. 126.
 50 For example, the regulation of 11 Sept. 1761, states 
that, since ‘the shutting in of sheep and geese on the 
meadows has currently been performed worse than it 
has ever been, notwithstanding the strict orders of the 
inheritors, also mentioned in the latest resolution of 
1758, even having installed new inspectors in order to 
aid the old inspectors, the chairmen of the assembly of 
the mark and the commissioned inheritors have pro-
posed to the assembly (in order to prevent additional 
costs and complaints) not to appoint any inspectors 
anymore, but to qualify all tenant farmers and peasants 
to pen up sheep and geese on the meadows and to be 
granted the usual fee for shutting in animals; and to 
order the chairman of the assembly of the mark and the 
commissioned inheritors (either together or separately) 
to lend a helping hand to anyone concerned and to 
proclaim this ruling at church’. Hannink, Markeboek 
Raalterwoold, p. 95.
 51 As mentioned in the regulation of the mark of 
Exel of 4 June 1661, referring to the new prohibition for 
all farmers and peasant farmers to transport any peat, 
and allowing all inheritors ‘to apprehend the offender 
within the city of Zutphen, the city of Deventer, or 
elsewhere, and to unharness the offender’s horses at 
that location, and to collect the fine, provided that the 
inheritor would account for his actions to the mark’. 
Beuzel, Markeboek Exel, p. 17. 
an order of 1794 stated that a schutter could be dismissed from his post if two ‘witnesses of 
irreproachable conduct’ would testify that the schutter had knowingly allowed offenders to dig 
sods ‘or do any other damage to the mark’.49
Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the appointments, appointed members could 
also gain some benefit from their appointment. The records of some marks mention a salary 
for the appointed members (often only in the context of the existing wages being raised). 
The salary could also be used as a way to incentivize the correct fulfilment of tasks by the 
appointed members: in some cases, they received a part of the fines they collected. Some of 
the regulations also seem to suggest that when stray cattle were impounded, the owner not 
only had to pay the fine for allowing his animals to wander, but also had to pay a certain sum 
for the impoundment itself – probably to cover the expenses of the schutters for taking care of 
the penned-up animals. 
In some cases, when the mark’s officers appeared to neglect their duty, all members of 
the mark were authorized to exercise justice on offenders. In general, what was envisaged in 
these circumstances was primarily of a physical nature; for example, they might impound an 
offender’s animals, unharness his horses, or immobilize his means of transport.50 Regulations 
also stated that the person reporting the offence was allowed to collect the fine from the 
offender, on the condition that he would disclose his action to the chairman of the assembly 
of the mark. This measure was also used for situations in which the appointed officials were 
unable to levy a penalty on the offender themselves, namely those offences reported outside 
of the mark itself. In those cases, each member was allowed to act according to the law (naar 
markerecht) on behalf of the mark.51
(b) Social control
Commoners without an official function were also encouraged to report free-riders by being 
promised part of the fine if the culprit could be caught. In some cases this could generate a 
handsome extra income. On 26 May 1618, the first recorded appointment of cattle pounders 
(schutters) in Exel – who were not only in charge of penning up animals that ran astray, but 
also of imposing other kinds of sanctions imposed on offenders – mentions that they were 
entitled to half of the fines for the offences they discovered. The revenues of the fines laid 
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 52 ‘Nobody will be allowed to dig … any more peat 
above the amount each one needs for his subsistence, 
offences to be sanctioned with a fine of five goudgulden 
per transport of peat out of the mark, one-third of this 
fine being to the benefit of the poor, one-third to the 
benefit of the inheritors, and one-third to the benefit 
of the chairman of the assembly of the mark.’ Beuzel, 
Markeboek Exel, p. 1. The ‘inheritors’ (erfgenamen) were 
those members of the mark who had (full) use and 
access rights to the common based on the use shares 
(waardelen) that were connected to their farm or estate 
(erf ).
 53 For example, in 1775, the fine for grazing animals 
on drifting sands – which had just been planted with 
lyme grass in order to stop them spreading further 
– was set at 10 goudgulden, of which half was to the 
benefit of the person reporting this offence. Menkveld 
and Renema, Markeboek Dunsborger Hattemer Marke, 
p. 139.
 54 Hannink, Markeboek Raalterwoold, p. 4.
 55 This type of sanction is not the same as a collective 
sanction whereby the whole group is punished for the 
wrongdoings of only one individual (as described by 
D. D. Heckathorn, ‘Collective sanctions and the crea-
tion of prisoner’s dilemma norms’, American J. Sociol-
ogy 94 (1988), pp. 535–62). Collective sanctions would 
anyhow be rather peculiar (and not effective) in a situ-
ation such as a common whereby the whole group sets 
a sanction.
 56 In most cases, the regulation sanctions the offence 
of accepting animals from outside of the common. In 
one particular case, the description of the participationis 
more extensive: in Raalterwoold in 1824, commoners 
who would have horses from outside the mark branded 
on the improper digging of peat were to be divided equally among the poor of the mark, 
the inheritors of the mark, and the chairman of the assembly of the mark.52 The earliest 
by-laws of Dunsborger Hattemer mark mention on several occasions that whoever reported 
an offence received a part of the fine imposed on the offender; given that the fines were set 
fairly high in this mark, a commoner could make a significant income by reporting offences 
to the authorities of the mark.53 Occasionally, the collection of fines normally reserved for the 
appointed members became also the right of individual commoners if the former were dilatory 
in performing their tasks. For instance, the 29th article of the earliest laws of the mark of 
Raalterwoold (1445; transcribed in 1615) states: 
No one but the chairmen of the assembly of the mark with the sworn members are allowed 
to pen up stray cattle; unless it would be the case that two inhabitants had pointed out 
animals to be penned up to the sworn members and the sworn members would refuse to 
pen up these animals – in that case the neighbours were entitled to pen up these animals 
themselves and would obtain half of the fine imposed, this fine to be collected by the sworn 
members.54
However, this power was a double-edged sword: commoners were in many cases also held liable 
for punishment if they did not report an offence. Liability clauses which made commoners 
responsible for reporting free-riders are found in the mark regulations with varying levels of 
severity according to the commoners’ degree of complicity in the committed crime.55 First 
of all, when members of the mark were actively participating in breaking the rules, not only 
the offender himself would be fined, but also his accomplice from within the mark. By-laws 
containing a liability clause on being an active ‘partner in crime’ do not mention the penalty 
imposed on the offending non-commoner – it may be that the punishment of the offender 
from outside was sufficiently covered by other legislation – but only the penalty to be imposed 
on the commoner who abetted this offence. Almost all of these regulations of this sort 
refer to the keeping of livestock: commoners were prohibited from accepting animals from 
non-commoners in order to prevent free-riding.56 
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Note 56 continued
as if these were their own, in order to graze them on 
the common, were sanctioned with a fine of 3 guilders 
per horse and in addition had their right to use the 
common for grazing horses revoked for the duration 
of one year. Hannink, Markeboek Raalterwoold, p. 162.
 57 Hannink, Markeboek Raalterwoold, p. 81.
 58 ‘[There have been] proposed measures to prevent 
the dipping of sheep in the waters of this mark by 
people from outside of the mark, in order to prevent 
any damage. It will be prohibited to all those living 
outside of the mark to dip their sheep in the waters 
of this mark, offences to be fined at 2 goudgulden. The 
inhabitants of the mark are obliged to take care no 
harm will be done to the belongings of the mark or the 
belongings of anyone else, offences to be punished by 
the highest fines for compensating the damage caused’. 
Hannink, Markeboek Raalterwoold, pp. 138–9.
 59 Hannink, Markeboek Raalterwoold, p. 81.
In addition, members of the mark who passively allowed non-members to make unauthorized 
use of the common resources or who did not report to the officers offences they saw taking 
place would often be penalized. In most instances the use of a liability clause was, however, 
confined to appointed members not fulfilling their duties: ‘passive’ complicity of regular 
members of the common was mentioned in only two of the sets of by-laws from the marks we 
have studied so far. In the first case, the liability clause referred to the permission aldermen, 
employers, or tenant farmers may have given to their dependents (servants, maids, children) 
to commit an offence. It was decided in those cases not to fine the person committing the 
offence, but the person who allowed the offence to be committed. Possibly this clause was 
used to prevent these aldermen, employers, and tenant farmers from gaining illegal profit by 
instructing those living with them or working for them to dig on their behalf.57 The other case 
of ‘passive’ complicity of regular members comes from 1806, when the assembly of the mark 
of Raalterwoold decided that commoners who allowed non-commoners to wash their sheep in 
the waters of the mark would have to pay ‘the highest compensation possible’ for the damage 
caused to the mark.58 
In most cases, the regulation stipulated a fine that was more or less equal to the amount of 
damage caused by the offence. In some cases, however, the penalties laid down on officeholders 
held liable for offences was far more punitive than for other members, clearly exceeding the 
amount required for simply compensating for the damage done (or the profit gained). In the 
case of the mark of Raalterwoold, for example, the fine was not merely a compensation for the 
damage caused, but was clearly also meant as punishment; the fine for sworn members (office-
holders) found to be guilty of connivance was set at four times the ordinary amount imposed 
on regular members committing the same offence.59
(c) Striking a good balance: the type of sanction and the level of the fine 
How did commoners know which type of penalty would deter an illegal action? And if a 
financial payment was part of the sanction, how high then should that fine be in order to be 
effective? In only a few cases do the penalties instituted by the mark provide us insight into the 
way in which their severity was calculated or what penalties sought to achieve, but the way in 
which the penalties were constructed provides us with insights into the (dis)incentive structure 
underpinning the by-laws. The records show that in some cases adjusting the fines was subject 
to a phase of trial-and-error. In the case in Exel, the fine for the offence of transporting peat 
out of the mark was set fairly high at 20 guilders in 1628, of which 5 guilders would be to the 
benefit of the person who reported the offence to the officials of the mark. The notes of the 
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 60 Beuzel, Markeboek Exel, p. 6.
 61 Users who violate the rules should be subject to 
graduated sanctions that are imposed by the users 
themselves or by officials accountable to them. See here 
Ostrom, Governing the commons, pp. 94–100.
 62 Menkveld and Renema, Markeboek Dunsborger 
Hattemer Marke, p. 3.
annual meeting of 1642, 14 years later, reveal that this high penalty had not been effective in 
two ways. First, the notes mention that all but six inhabitants of the mark of Exel had broken 
this rule and should have been fined. Second, the mark’s amendment to its earlier decision 
seems to indicate that the level of the fines set may have been a deterrent to the enforcement 
of the rule. It was then decided to lower the fines from 20 to 4½ guilders (those having used 
carts from outside the mark however being liable to pay double, i.e. 9 guilders).60
In the literature, it is not only the level of the fine, but the type of fine, and then mostly 
the use of ‘graduated sanctioning’ which has received a great deal of attention. It is identified 
by Ostrom as one of the principles underpinning the successful design of common-pool 
resources.61 Graduated sanctioning refers to the way in which a penalty is increased for repeat 
offences committed by the same individual, the final and highest penalty being the forfeiture 
of use rights. However, the number of graduated sanctions found within the regulations of 
Dutch marks is quite small: from the 1137 by-laws analysed, graduated sanctioning is found 
in no more than 20 (1.8 per cent). From the content of the graduated sanctions it seems that 
there was a general consensus that the toleration of offenders only extended to two warnings. 
When offenders were caught committing the same offence for the third time, the penalty was 
designed to disable him from committing any future offences (by suspending his use rights). 
Alternately the penalty for the third consecutive offence was to be determined at the moment 
the offender was caught.
The status of the offender, the time or location the offence was committed, or some 
combination of these was more decisive in determining the penalty levied than the number 
of offences committed. Within the body of rules we can discern three types of differentiation. 
The most common was between members of the mark or non-members. Offences committed 
by non-members were usually penalized at double the members’ rate; we may assume that 
this was meant to compensate for the relatively higher profit non-members gained from their 
offences, since the mark would not receive any countervailing income from them (such as a 
contribution to the general maintenance and functioning of the mark). 
Whereas other marks tended to punish offenders from outside the mark with heavy, and 
sometimes graduated, sanctions (including the impounding of resources), the sanction in the 
Dunsborgermark for any offence that would damage the mark committed by a foreign offender 
was far more physical in nature: if the foreign offender was caught, the members of the mark, 
together with the chairman of the assembly of the mark, were allowed to ‘break the keyholes 
[lutsgaten] of the axles of the cart, decapitate the livestock, and the driver of the cart would be 
at the mercy of the members of the mark and their chairman of the assembly of the mark’.62 
The remarkable severity of the aforementioned sanction does not seem to be exceptional for this 
mark. For instance, whereas the digging of sods within the mark of Exel in 1643 was sanctioned 
by imposing a fine of 5 oude schilden (equivalent to about 7½ guilders), the fine in 1637 for the 
same offence within the Dunsborger Hattemer mark had been set at 20 guilders. The harsh 
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 63 Hannink, Markeboek Raalterwoold, p. 60.
 64 Ibid., p. 81.
 65 In the first set of rules in the markenboek of Berkum, 
for example, the sworn member was explicitly forbid-
den to ‘acquit anyone of this fines’. Historisch Centrum 
Overijssel, Archief Marken in de provincie Overijssel, 
no. 0157, inv. nr. 148, Markeboek 1300–1656 (composed 
1648), fos 6v–6r. The first set of rules of the mark of 
Raalterwoold of 22 August 1445 urges all chairmen 
that are to be appointed to deal with the non-imposed 
punishment of destroying equipment or animals was however only applied to offenders from 
outside of the common. A logical explanation for this would be that to damage the equipment 
of members of the mark for offences they committed would in the end damage the interests of 
the mark.
A second type of differentiation was related to the time of the day the offence was committed. 
For example, at the assembly meeting of the mark of Raalterwoold of 6 July 1654, the penalty 
for outsiders transporting turf out of the mark without prior notification given to and authori-
zation by the sworn members, was set at the impounding of the turf only, whereas the penalty 
for the same infringement committed at night was not only the impounding of the collected 
turf, but also an additional fine of 10 golden guilders (goudgulden); the latter penalty, by the 
way, also applied to anyone from within the common caught transporting turf out of the mark 
at night.63 This seems to indicate that the fine correlates with the risk of discovery and the 
subsequent maximum size of unjustified profit for the offender. It is obviously harder to detect 
offences committed at night, hence the potential amount of damage (and thus the potential 
gain by offenders operating at night) could be higher than that of offenders operating in the 
daytime; therefore, the compensation for the potential damage done to the market should be 
higher. The types of differentiation mentioned above could also be used in combination. For 
example, in Raalterwoold, in article 4 of the regulations of 26 August 1806, it states that the 
fines mentioned in article 3 of the same regulation (regarding the collection of manure and 
peat in prohibited areas of the mark) should be doubled when the offences were committed 
between sunset and sunrise by inhabitants of the mark, and quadrupled for offenders living 
outside the mark.
The third type of differentiation concerned the officeholders of the mark. Often, offences 
committed by them were to be punished at a penal rate. This might have been designed to 
emphasize the exemplary function these officers were supposed to fulfil. But from a financial 
point of view, the explanation could be that the sanctions for officials and appointed members 
needed to be higher to avoid temptation: their authority and the access they had to the resources 
of the mark might have made the temptation to free-ride greater, and thus the sanction needed 
to be higher as well (e.g., the by-laws promulgated at Raalterwoold in 1704 stated that appointed 
members who committed offences should be fined four times the amount that was imposed on 
regular members committing the same offence).64 
The collection of fines appears to have posed a problem at all periods. Several by-laws either 
implicitly or explicitly suggest that the collection of fines was not performed as well as it 
should have been: from the content of the rules it can be concluded that some of the schutters 
overlooked their fellow commoners’ fines. Even the chairman of the assembly of the mark was 
threatened with penalties if he did not secure the payment of all imposed fines before the end 
of his term: the by-laws set out that any deficit remaining at the end of his term was supposed 
to be satisfied by the chairman himself.65
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Note 65 continued
fines well before the moment of their abdication, ‘in 
order to free the new chairmen of the assembly of the 
mark from the burden of collecting still unpaid fines’. 
Hannink, Markeboek Raalterwoold, p. 5.
 66 In the case of the estate of Ter Aest, for example, 
the owners were held to pay both a lamb and some 
money annually to the mark to be entitled to the use of 
their share. In 1650, however, the payments due by Ter 
Aest had accumulated to 100 guilders and five lambs 
over a period of 22 years (1628–50). Another example 
was the couple of hens that two users of the common, 
Prijser and Greve (their names may refer to a certain 
function they had within the mark, but this cannot be 
confirmed on the basis of the notes of the meetings), 
were held to pay annually at the meeting of the assem-
bly of the mark. Although this debt was mentioned 
over and over again at every subsequent meeting and 
it also was mentioned several times that the outstand-
ing debt should be collected by the officials in charge 
of collecting debts and fines on behalf of the mark, the 
debt increased year after year over a period of up to 14 
years: Beuzel, Markeboek Exel, p. 15.
 67 E.g., the member Broeckman was held to pay a 
lamb each year for using his (contested) right to graze 
his sheep on the common. On 25 June 1660, the chair-
man of the assembly of the mark together with the 
inheritors decided to solve this recurring issue once 
and for all, deciding ‘that Broeckman once and for all 
will honour the chairman of the assembly of the mark 
and the inheritors at the forthcoming annual meeting 
by presenting them a barrel of Haarlemmer beer and 
an anker of good wine; in return, Broeckman will be 
allowed to graze a herd of 50 sheep on the common 
and will be acquitted of the debt he has regarding the 
annual donation of lambs’. Beuzel, Markeboek Exel, 
p. 16.
 68 Prijser for example was appointed as schutter on 
1 Aug. 1656: Beuzel, Markeboek Exel, p. 13. At that 
moment, however, he was already in debt for about a 
dozen couples of hens, as the resolutions of the annual 
meeting of 1659 show: ibid., p. 15.
 69 Respectively Beuzel, Markeboek Exel, p. 18 and 
Hannink, Markeboek Raalterwoold, p. 130.
This inability to enforce the by-laws made by the mark’s assembly needs to be seen in the 
light of other resolutions referring to arrears of other payments to the mark that accumulated 
unpaid year after year. Although non-payment was mentioned time and time again at the 
annual meetings of the mark, the offenders remained in default, in some cases for up to 16 
years.66 The apparent incapacity of the mark to make debtors pay their ever-increasing fines 
created a problem of its own: fines accumulated to such an extent that it became clear that 
the debtors would never be able to pay off their debts without going bankrupt. Most of these 
cases were, therefore, in the end resolved by arranging a settlement with the debtor: the fine 
was heavily reduced, on the condition that this reduced fine was paid instantly and future 
payments should be paid promptly.67 Although this enabled the mark to keep the members in 
default aboard, the minutes of the meetings show this was not an efficient formula, since some 
years later, the same debtors faced the same problem again. Surprisingly enough, the same 
debtors were also appointed as cattle pounders (schutters) themselves when it was their turn.68
The assembly of commoners could also decide to mitigate the sums imposed by fines or 
mandatory payments where individual commoners appeared to be unable to pay their dues 
because of illness, old age, or accidents. For instance, in Exel in 1662, some widows were 
allowed to stay in their cottages after the death of their husbands, and use the cottages and 
the surrounding gardens rent free for the rest of their lives (on the condition that the cottages 
would fall to the mark again after their deaths); in a case of 1802 from the mark of Raalterwoold, 
commoner Hendrik Woolthaar was acquitted not only of his overdue rents, but also exempted 
from future rent payments for a period because his house burnt down.69 On the other hand, 
there are also examples of situations in which, where a fine was not paid, the penalty on the 
recalcitrant was even increased or his cattle were distrained – even sold – in order to satisfy his 
debts to the mark. 
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III
The analysis of ways to control commoners’ behaviour largely remains to be undertaken, but is 
much needed in order to understand how self-governance can be effectively organized through 
institutions for collective action. The debate on the quality of the functioning of institutions, 
which should be the next step in trying to understand the role of institutions in economy 
and society at large, would surely benefit from a better understanding of the mechanisms 
institutions use to achieve resilience, to survive generations, crises, wars, and so on. The four 
case studies presented here demonstrate the wide range of methods, other than simple punitive 
sanctions, that existed in the early modern period to control commoners’ behaviour in order to 
prevent free-riding. Besides the regulation to limit the use of the common resources – which 
we have not discussed in this article – two main strategies to control behaviour were present: 
monitoring – amongst others through social control – and punishment of offences. What is 
most striking is the responsibility placed on the commoners themselves to detect and report 
the detection of the offences. 
Although we have limited our analysis here to normative sources, and have not included 
other sources such as account books that could give an impression of the actual collection 
of monetary penalties, it has already been mentioned that little reference can be found in the 
markeboeken to the implementation of penalties. There are two potential explanations for this: 
either they were not properly imposed, or discipline and good conduct were so good that there 
was no need for the execution of the penalties. Although we also found references to difficulties 
in imposing and collecting fines in some cases, the combination of methods, and the many 
conditional factors included to tailor penalties to the severity of the offence and the background 
of the offender, do suggest that rather than imposing and executing flat rate penalties on all 
the transgressing commoners, the rules were very well-tuned to the local conditions and 
more directed towards preventing offences. Such sophisticated methods may have proven to 
be more effective in preventing free-riding than simply fining offenders and thus might turn 
out to be a more cost-effective and conflict-avoiding way towards achieving resilient commons 
management. That sophisticated strategies for the punishment of free-loading existed may help 
to explain why so many commons managed to survive over very long periods of time and have 
implications for other collective institutions. 
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